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I. INTRODUCTION
Extended absences from work due to medical conditions and caring
for loved ones have historically been a concern of both employees and
employers. Passage of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA)1 established legal obligations of employers and brought re-
lief to millions of employees with such concerns. The Act provides job
security to many employees who must be absent from work because of
their own illnesses, to care for a family member who is ill, or to care
for a newborn.2 However, the statute has also led to litigation con-
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Salmon P. Chase College of Law; B.A. in Economics, Indiana
University, 2003. Special thanks to Robert W. Carran, partner at Taliaferro, Mehling, Shirooni,
Carran & Keys in Covington, Kentucky; Lawrence Rosenthal, Professor of Law at Chase Col-
lege of Law; and my entire family.
** Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky University, Chase College of Law
1. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2004). See generally Megan E. Blomquist, A Shield, Not a
Sword: Involuntary Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 76 WASH. L. REV. 509
(2001); Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understanding of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 45
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 457 (1995); Nancy E. DeSimone & Adriane J. Dudley, The Family Medi-
cal Leave Act: An Overview and Analysis, 26 URB. LAW 83 (1994); Christopher R. Hedican,
Jason M. Hedican & Mark P.A. Hudson, McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 DRAKE L. REV.
383 (2004).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
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cerning claims that arise from employees exercising their rights cre-
ated by FMLA.
The FMLA prohibits an employer from interfering with, re-
straining, or denying the exercise of (or attempts to exercise) any
rights provided by the Act, and discharging or in any other way dis-
criminating against any person for opposing or complaining about any
unlawful practice under the Act.' Employee FMLA claims generally
allege interference with FMLA rights or retaliation/discrimination for
invoking FMLA rights.
In allocating the burden of proof necessary in all types of employ-
ment discrimination cases, including FMLA cases, courts have tradi-
tionally used the burden-shifting framework established by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.4 Under this
approach, the plaintiff must first present a prima facie case of discrim-
ination. Next, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions. Finally, the plaintiff has the opportunity to demon-
strate that the employer's reason for the adverse employment action
was a mere pretext for discrimination.5
In 2003, the Supreme Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,6 a sex
discrimination case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, substantially reduced the showing a plaintiff must make under
McDonnell Douglas. Under Desert Palace, the "third burden" of the
traditional McDonnell Douglas framework is modified to allow the
plaintiff to rebut an employer's proof of a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason by demonstrating either: (1) the defendant's reason is not
true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination; or (2) the defendant's
reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and an-
other "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic.7
After Desert Palace, the employee is no longer required to provide
direct evidence of retaliation. 8 This change provided a less onerous
burden and allowed retaliation claims to be proved using circumstan-
tial evidence, thus increasing the substantive value of circumstantial
evidence. 9
The issue presented in this article is whether the heightened stan-
dard of proof in the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
3. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 (2000).
4. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5. Id. at 798.
6. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
7. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, 376 F.3d 305, 312 (2004) (citing Rishel v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 (M.D.N.C. 2003)).
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analysis should continue to be used in FMLA cases or if that height-
ened standard of proof should be relaxed as per Desert Palace. Lower
federal courts are split on whether Desert Palace extends to FMLA
retaliation claims. Those courts holding that it does apply reason that
the statutory text of the FMLA, like that of Title VII, does not require
a heightened showing through direct evidence. Those courts refusing
to apply the relaxed standard of Desert Palace to FMLA retaliation
claims reason that the holding in Desert Palace only applies to Title
VII claims, and if the Supreme Court intended otherwise, the Court
would have stated so unmistakably.
This article argues that the modified McDonnell Douglas approach
that evolved out of the Title VII case, Desert Palace v. Costa, should
apply to FMLA retaliation claims as well. Part II of this article dis-
cusses the backgrounds of FMLA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, and claims under those Acts. Part III discusses the Supreme
Court case of Desert Palace v. Costa, the modified standard of proof,
its effects on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, and its
impact on FMLA retaliation claims. 10 Part IV analyzes the changes in
the aftermath of Desert Palace, and proposes a uniform application
using the modified McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis for
FMLA retaliation claims. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993.
In February 1993, President Clinton signed his administration's first
major piece of legislation into law, the Family Medical Leave Act of
1993. The FMLA allows eligible employees, upon notice to their em-
ployer, to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave annually for spe-
cific reasons.1 " The FMLA applies only to employers who engage in
interstate commerce and who employ fifty or more employees for
each working day for twenty or more calendar workweeks in the cur-
rent or preceding calendar year.12 In addition, an employee is eligible
to take FMLA leave if he/she has been employed for at least twelve
months,1 3 for at least 1250 hours during the previous twelve-month
period, 4 and at a work site where fifty or more employees are em-
ployed by the same employer within seventy-five miles of the work
site.15
10. Id.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq (2004).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (2000).
13. See id. at (2)(A)(i).
14. Id. at (2)(A)(ii).
15. Id. at (2)(B)(ii).
3
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An eligible employee may take leave under the FMLA if that leave
(1) relates to the birth or care of the employee's newborn child; (2) is
the result of the placement of a child with the employee for adoption
or foster care; (3) concerns the care of an employee's child, spouse, or
parent having a serious health condition; or (4) is the result of the
employee's serious health condition when he/she is unable to perform
the requirements of his or her job.16 Employees need only notify their
employers that they will be absent under circumstances to which the
FMLA leave might apply.17
The employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or
even mention the FMLA but may state only that leave is needed (for
a qualifying reason). The employer should inquire further of the em-
ployee if it is necessary to have more information about whether
FMLA leave is being sought by the employee and obtain the neces-
sary details of the leave to be taken. In the case of medical conditions,
the employer may find it necessary to inquire further to determine if
the leave is because of a serious health condition and may request
medical certification to support the need for such leave.18
Initially, the employee must notify the employer that the leave the
employee is requesting is for a qualified reason.19 The employer must
then determine if the reason for the leave is, in fact, covered under the
FMLA.2 ° A further inquiry may be necessary based on the serious-
ness of the health condition, and an employer may require a certifica-
tion from a treating physician.2'
In instituting the FMLA, Congress found that the number of single-
parent households and two-parent households where the single parent
or both parents work are increasingly significant problems, and that
there is a lack of employment policies to accommodate working par-
ents.22 The lack of policies forces parents to choose between job se-
curity and parenting.23  In developing the FMLA, Congress
recognized the importance for the development of children and the
family unit of both parents being able to participate in early childrear-
ing and care of family members who have serious health conditions.24
Further, Congress realized that due to the nature of women's and
men's roles in our society, the primary responsibility for family care-
taking often falls on women and often affects the working lives of wo-
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1)(A-D).
17. Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1130 (9th Cir. 2001).
18. Id. at 1130-31 (citing § 29 C.F.R. 825.302(c) (2004)).
19. Bachelder, 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1)-(3) (2004).
23. Id. at (a)(3).
24. Id. at (a)(2).
2005]
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men more than it affects the working lives of men. Thus, employment
standards are only applied to one gender.2 5 This created a serious po-
tential for encouraging employers to discriminate against employees
and applicants for employment who are of that gender.26 Based on
these findings, the FMLA balances the demands of the workplace
with the needs of families to promote the stability and economic se-
curity of families and promotes national interests by preserving family
integrity.2 7
The Act's purpose is to entitle employees to reasonable leave for
medical reasons, while accommodating the legitimate interests of em-
ployers.28 The FMLA further minimizes the potential for employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that
leave is available for eligible medical reasons, as well as compelling
family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis, which promotes the goal of
equal employment opportunities for women and men.29
An employee's exercise of FMLA rights cannot be waived,30 inter-
fered with, restrained, or denied.31 The statute prohibits certain acts
by an employer and provides extensive remedies to employees seek-
ing enforcement of their FMLA rights.32
When an eligible employee returns from leave, the employer must
restore the employee to the position of employment held when the
leave began or to an equivalent position with equivalent employment
benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.33 Al-
though the FMLA has the appearance of requiring an employer to
return employees to pre-leave conditions, there is nothing in the stat-
ute that can be construed to require a restoration of employees as to
seniority or employment benefits that may have accrued during the
leave or any right, benefit, or position of employment other than that
which the employee would have been entitled had s/he not taken the
leave.34
When a violation of FMLA rights occurs, there are two possible
types of claims that an employee can bring: (1) interference with
25. Id. at (a)(5).
26. Id. at (a)(6).
27. Id. at (b)(1).
28. Id. at (b)(2)-(3).
29. Id. at (b)(4)-(5).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2005).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2000).
32. 29 U.S.C § 2617(a)(1)(A) (providing for "wages, salary, employment benefits or other
compensation"); 29 U.S.C § 2617(a)(1)(B) (providing for "such equitable relief as may be appro-
priate, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion"); and 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (a)(3) (pro-
viding for "reasonable attorney's fee, reasonable expert witness fees, and other costs").
33. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1993).
34. Id. at (a)(3).
5
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rights claims, and (2) retaliation/discrimination claims.35 Although
both claims deal with an employer violating an employee's statutory
rights, both involve different standards of proof. Under a claim of
interference with FMLA rights, a plaintiff must prove, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that the taking of FMLA covered leave con-
stituted a negative factor in the decision to fire the employee.36 For
retaliation claims, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is
employed.37
1. Interference With Rights Claims
It is unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny
the exercise of, any right provided under the FMLA.38 Employer ac-
tions that deter employees from participating in protected activities
constitute "interference" or "restraint" of the employees' exercise of
their rights.39 The FMLA entitles employees to engage in particular
activities under the FMLA and to take leave from work for FMLA
qualifying reasons. The FMLA also shields employees from employer
interference and restraint.4a
Under the FMLA and many other statutes, attaching negative con-
sequences to the exercise of protected rights lessen an employee's
willingness to exercise those rights. Employees are less likely to exer-
cise their FMLA leave rights if they fear discipline or discharge. An
employer's use of an employee's FMLA leave as a negative factor in
employment actions violates this Act.41 This prohibition encompasses
an employer's consideration of an employee's use of FMLA-covered
leave in making adverse employment decisions.42
In Bachelder v. America West Airlines, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered an employee's use of FMLA-covered leave with
respect to an employer making an adverse employment decision.4 3 In
Bachelder, an employee took absences that the employer asserted
were not covered under the FMLA and used those absences as a neg-
ative factor in its decision to fire the employee.44 The court held that
35. 29 USC § 2615(a)(1) (interference theory) and 29 USC § 2615(a)(2) (retaliation or dis-
crimination theory). Further, the FMLA creates a cause of action at 29 USC § 2617(a) for em-
ployees to enforce their FMLA rights on the basis of one of these two theories.
36. Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001).
37. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 2915(a)(1) (1998).
39. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124.
40. Id.
41. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2005).
42. Id.
43. Bachelder, 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001).
44. See generally Bachelder, 259 F. 3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001). The court reversed the prior
decision, directed the district court to grant the employee's cross-motion for summary judgment
as to liability, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
2005]
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the employee absences were, in fact, protected by the FLMA.4 5 The
court concluded:
In order to prevail on her claim,.. [plaintiff] need only prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that her taking of FMLA-protected
leave constituted a negative factor in the decision to terminate her.
She can prove this claim, by using either direct or circumstantial evi-
dence, or both ... no scheme shifting the burden of production back
and forth is required.4 6
The mere fact that the employer uses the taking of FMLA leave as a
negative factor in employment actions violates this Act.47 The FMLA
aims to protect an employee against disciplinary action based on ab-
sences, if those absences are for one of the Act's many enumerated
reasons.
2. Retaliation/Discrimination Claims pre Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa
It is unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any individual for opposing practices made un-
lawful by the FMLA. 48 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation
under the FMLA, employees must show that: (1) they exercised rights
protected under the FMLA; (2) they were qualified for the position;
(3) they suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse
employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an in-
ference of retaliatory intent.49
Traditionally, courts have used the burden-shifting framework de-
lineated in the Supreme Court case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green50 to evaluate a claim of retaliation under the FMLA. McDon-
nell Douglas was the first case in which the Supreme Court addressed
the framework of the burden-shifting analysis in employment discrim-
ination litigation with respect to Title VII claims.51
The McDonnell Douglas Court stated that the proper framework
for how a claim of employment discrimination must be litigated is as
follows: (1) the plaintiff must be given the opportunity to present a
prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the employer must be given the
opportunity to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; and (3) the plain-
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1125.
47. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2005).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2000).
49. Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2004), aff'g Potenza v. City of
New York Dep't of Transp., No. 00 Civ. 0707 (SHS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17112 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 23, 2001).
50. Id. at 167.
51. Id.
7
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tiff is afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's
reason for the adverse employment action was a mere pretext for
discrimination.52
FMLA claims use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting once the
elements of a prima facie case have been met.53 Potenza v. City of
New York, a Second Circuit Court of Appeals case, illustrates the Mc-
Donnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis under an FMLA retaliation
claim.54 In Potenza, an employee brought suit, alleging retaliation
against him for taking FMLA-protected leave.5 5 The employee al-
leged that an adverse employment action was taken because he had
taken a one-month medical leave to have surgery on his knee. The
employee had requested accommodations for the ensuing physical
therapy.56
After the employee is given the opportunity to present a prima facie
case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie evidence by articulating a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for its actions.57 In Potenza, the court held that
the employer had rebutted the employee's prima facie case by insist-
ing, instead, that it had removed the employee from his position be-
cause of poor job performance and because it was more efficient to
locate his position, a port manager, within the operations department
rather than the maintenance department, from which he came.58 This
rebuttal goes to the fourth element of a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion that the adverse employment action occurred under circum-
stances giving rise to an inference of retaliatory intent.59
Once the employer is afforded an opportunity to rebut the plain-
tiff's prima facie case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions, the burden then shifts back to the employee to
demonstrate that the employer's reason for the adverse employment
action was a mere pretext for discrimination.6 °
52. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
53. Potenza, 365 F.3d at 167.
54. Id. at 165.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 166.
57. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
58. Potenza, 365 F.3d at 166.
59. Id.
60. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804; Potenza, 365 F.3d at 168 (discussing the
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B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pre Desert Palace
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196461 makes it illegal to dis-
criminate against any person in any matter affecting employment.62
Title VII creates statutory rights against discrimination in employ-
ment, and establishes a scheme to vindicate those rights. It was en-
acted to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating
practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin, aims broadly to eradicate discrimination
throughout, and seeks to make persons whole for injuries suffered
through past discrimination.63
Under Title VII, there are two theories of employment discrimina-
tion: disparate treatment and disparate impact. The former is either a
single motive or a mixed-motive case and occurs when the claimant
alleges the employer intentionally treated him or her less favorably
than others due to his race, religion, color, national origin or sex.6 4 In
such cases the complainant must prove that: (a) a pattern of harass-
ment or intimidation exists, (b) the employer knew or should have
known of the illegal conduct, and (c) the employer failed to take rea-
sonable steps to cure the conduct.65 The Supreme Court first recog-
nized the single motive disparate treatment concept,66 and later
recognized that a company may have acted for both illegal and legal
reasons, giving rise to mixed-motives claims. 67 Disparate treatment
claims under Title VII utilize the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis.
The second type of discrimination claim under Title VII is disparate
impact, which occurs when an employer's facially neutral policy or
practice causes the employee to be treated differently from others be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 68 The disparate
impact analysis uses a different burden-shifting approach than that of
disparate treatment.
In a Title VII retaliation case, the plaintiff first must establish a
prima facie case. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
61. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-1981 (2000).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1)-(17) (2000).
64. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1).
65. See generally Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussing a
single motive disparate treatment case).
66. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 795 (1973).
67. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989).
68. See generally Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977) (distin-
guishing disparate impact claims from those of disparate treatment claims); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-432 (1971) (discussing disparate impact in the context of employers
requiring a high school education or the passing of a general intelligence test as a condition of
employment in or transfer to jobs).
9
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under Title VII, a plaintiff must first show that: (1) s/he engaged in
statutorily protected expression, (2) s/he suffered an adverse employ-
ment action, and (3) there is a causal link between the protected ex-
pression and the adverse action.69 Second, the employer must prove
that the motives for its decisions were non-discriminatory.7" Third,
the plaintiff employee must prove that the employer's proffered rea-
son is a mere pretext and the real reason was unlawful
discrimination.71
III. DESERT PALACE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FMLA
The framework established by the United States Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas in 1973 has largely remained intact with respect
to employment discrimination cases. 72 However, in Desert Palace Inc.
v. Costa, the Supreme Court of the United States modified the thirty-
year-old burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas.73
In Desert Palace, a former employee sued her employer, alleging
sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 74
The employee alleged that she was stalked by a supervisor, received
harsher discipline than men did, and was treated less favorably than
men were in the assignment of overtime. She also alleged that super-
visors stacked her disciplinary record and used or tolerated sex-based
slurs against her.75 The district court gave the jury a mixed-motive
instruction. The court rejected the employer's objection that employ-
ees were not entitled to a mixed-motive instruction if the employee
had failed to provide direct evidence that sex was a motivating factor
in her dismissal.76 A jury rendered a verdict for the employee and
awarded her damages.77 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's judgment.78
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a plaintiff must
present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-
69. Porter v. Chicago Park Dist., 155 F. Supp 2d 857, 860 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
70. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003).
71. Id.
72. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (discussing the
framework established with respect to employment discrimination cases).
73. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 93.
74. Id. See also Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002) (for further recita-
tion of the facts).
75. See generally Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 101. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court did not err
in giving a mixed motive instruction to the jury.
2005]
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motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 79
The plaintiff argued that a heightened standard of proof was not pre-
sent and the employee did not have to present direct evidence because
the statute stated that she need only "demonstrate" that her employer
used forbidden consideration in employment against her.8 0 The em-
ployer argued that for the plaintiff employee to be given a mixed-
motive instruction, she had to present direct evidence of discrimina-
tion by the employer.81
The starting point for the Court's analysis was the statutory text. 2
Because the statute did not mention, much less require, that a plaintiff
make a heightened showing through direct evidence, the Court held
that direct evidence was not required.83 The Court went on to state
that other statutes have been specifically identified as imposing
heightened proof requirements, and if the drafters of Title VII wanted
to have a heightened standard, they would have included such.8"
The Court in Desert Palace acknowledged the utility of circumstan-
tial evidence in discrimination cases.8 5 The Court reasoned that treat-
ing circumstantial evidence and direct evidence alike is both clear and
deep-rooted. 6 The Court went on to state that "[c]ircumstantial evi-
dence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying
and persuasive than direct evidence. 8s7
Under the new modified McDonnell Douglas approach derived
from Desert Palace, the plaintiff must still demonstrate a prima facie
case of discrimination.88 The defendant then must articulate a legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate the
plaintiff and, if the defendant meets its burden of production, the
plaintiff must then offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact of either: (1) the defendant's reason is not true, but is
instead a pretext for discrimination; or (2) the defendant's reason,
while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another 'mo-
tivating factor' is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (mixed-mo-
tive[s])., 9 If a plaintiff demonstrates that another factor was a
motivating factor in the employment decision, it then falls to the de-
79. Id. at 97.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 98.
83. Id. at 99.
84. Id. at 101.
85. Id. at 100 (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 (1957)).
86. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100.
87. Id.
88. See generally Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
89. Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Rishel v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 (M.D.N.C. 2003)). See also Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (2003) (further discussing the burden shifting analysis).
11
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fendant to prove that the same adverse employment decision would
have been made regardless of discriminatory animus.9 ° If the em-
ployer fails to carry this burden, the plaintiff prevails.
Desert Palace modified the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis for Title VII claims. The issue presented in this article is
whether the Desert Palace modification of the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis will extend to other statutes, such as the Fam-
ily Medical Leave Act. There are two possibilities arising from this
issue: 1) the holding in Desert Palace changed everything by modifying
the McDonnell Douglas framework and relaxing the once heightened
standard of proof requiring direct evidence; or 2) the holding in Desert
Palace changed nothing beyond its implications on Title VII claims.
A. Desert Palace Changed Everything
Considering the post Desert Palace increase in respectability and re-
liance on circumstantial evidence, lower courts may be more willing to
consider circumstantial evidence sufficient to create a mixed motive
case under other statutes than just Title VII. For example, the Middle
District of Louisiana in Oby v. Baton Rouge Marriott, applied the Su-
preme Court's reasoning in Desert Palace to an FMLA claim based on
retaliation.91 In Oby, the employee was a long-time housekeeping
manager for the employer's hotel who requested and was granted
leave under the FMLA to care for an ill parent.92 During the em-
ployee's leave, the employer advised the employee that, if the em-
ployee's leave continued, the employer would need to find a new
housekeeping manager. 93 A new housekeeping manager was subse-
quently hired and the employee was offered a position as food and
beverage manager. 94 The employee declined the position based on a
lack of experience and a religious belief against serving alcohol.95 The
employee sued the employer under the FMLA, arguing that the em-
ployer had retaliated against her for taking her FMLA leave by not
reinstating her to her pre-leave position.96
90. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312.
91. Oby v. Baton Rouge Marriott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 772 (2004).
92. Id. at 775.
93. Id. at 776.
94. Id. at 777.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 787. The court ultimately found that the employee failed to show a cause of action
in interference or retaliation under the FMLA and granted Summary Judgment to the employer.
The court based its finding on the fact that although the employee was not reinstated as house-
keeping manager, the employer satisfied the FMLA by offering the employee a substantially
equivalent position with similar duties and the same salary, even though the salary was higher
than the existing salary for a food and beverage manager. In the alternative, the employee was
clearly a key employee who could properly be denied reinstatement based on the legitimate
business need to have someone perform the employee's duties.
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Since the employee in Oby based her retaliation claim on circum-
stantial evidence, prior to Desert Palace, the court, presumably, would
have used the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analy-
sis. However, the Oby court took a different approach, finding that
the theme for interpreting statutory construction in Desert Palace is to
look at the statutory text first, and then determine whether the text
requires a showing of direct evidence. 97 The text of the FMLA, like
the text of Title VII, does not require a heightened showing through
direct evidence to prove retaliation or discrimination. 98 The court
concluded that the Desert Palace rationale applied to the plaintiff's
FMLA retaliation claim as well as Title VII claims, and therefore, a
heightened showing of direct evidence is not required. 99 The court
recognized the use of the modified McDonnell Douglas analysis in an
FMLA retaliation claim regardless of the type of evidence put
forward.
The Oby court's use of the modified McDonnell Douglas analysis
also follows the holding in Rachid v. Jack In The Box,' °0 a Fifth Circuit
ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) case. Rachid, like
the Oby court, started its analysis with the statutory text and found
the ADEA to be silent as to a heightened direct evidence standard. °1
The court in Rachid noted that due to the heightened pleading re-
quirement in other statutes, direct evidence of discrimination is not
necessary to receive a mixed-motive analysis for an ADEA claim.'0°
Given the similarity between Title VII, ADEA and the FMLA, and
their silence with regard to a heightened direct evidence standard, the
court reasoned that those changes that emerged as a result of Desert
Palace should be equally applicable to claims brought under other em-
ployment discrimination statutes.
Bergen v. Continental Casualty Company,"3 a United States District
Court case from the Northern District of Texas, is further evidence of
growing recognition of the modified McDonnell Douglas approach,
delineated in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. In Bergen, the plaintiff em-
ployee sued the defendant employer for age, sex, and disability dis-
97. Id. at 786.
98. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991)
and 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (purporting to show that the absence of direct language that a
heightened showing through direct evidence to prove retaliation or discrimination implies that
circumstantial evidence can be used).
99. Oby, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
100. Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). In Rachid, the Fifth
Circuit held that Desert Palace modified the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis in ADEA cases so that a plaintiff could proceed on a mixed-motive theory even without
direct evidence of discrimination.
101. Id. at 311 (citing Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003)).
102. Id.
103. Bergen v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 368 F. Supp. 2d 567 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
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crimination and retaliation under the ADEA, Title VII and
Americans with Disabilities Act. 04 The Bergen Court, "agrees with,
and adopts its sister court's rationale in applying the modified Mc-
Donnell Douglas approach to ADEA and retaliation claims. ' 10 5 The
court went on to note that other district courts in its Circuit have
taken the lead in applying the "modified McDonnell Douglas" to Title
VII and retaliation cases including Mississippi 0 6 and Louisiana." 7
The traditional scheme for analyzing an employee's retaliation
claim pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis has
been modified. Before Desert Palace, courts were faced with argu-
ments dealing with whether the evidence presented by an employee
claiming retaliation under the FMLA was direct or indirect. After the
Court's decision in Desert Palace, judicial interpretation of the statu-
tory text of the FMLA did not require the heightened standard by
requiring direct evidence, as evidenced by the court in Oby. °8 Desert
Palace makes it easier for a plaintiff-employee to meet his/her burden,
and more difficult for a defendant-employer to ultimately prevail, by
making a summary judgment resolution more difficult.
B. Desert Palace Changed Only Title VII
The Court in Desert Palace found that it is not necessary to present
direct evidence of a discriminatory reason for an adverse employment
decision to raise the existence of a mixed motive claim and for a
mixed motive instruction. 10 9 Some courts have been apprehensive ap-
plying that holding to anything beyond Title VII claims.
An example is Herawi v. State of Alabama Department of Forensic
Sciences," a Middle District of Alabama case in which the court
opined that McDonnell Douglas is still a viable and working frame-
work for analyzing Title VII claims."' In Herawi, the employee
claimed that she was fired because of her national origin and in retali-
ation for her complaints of national origin discrimination. 1 2 The em-
ployer moved for summary judgment, but the court denied it with
respect to the Title VII claim." 3 The Herawi court distinguished De-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 573.
106. Warren v. Terex Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 641, 647 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (Title VII race and
retaliation claims).
107. Oby v. Baton Rouge Marriott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 772, 786 (M.D. La. 2004) (Family Medi-
cal Leave Act retaliation claim).
108. Id.
109. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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sert Palace and utilized the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework."1 The court went on to state, ".. .there is nothing
in Desert Palace that undermines the continued usefulness of McDon-
nell Douglas to trial courts, in either single- or mixed-motive cases
based on circumstantial evidence... McDonnell Douglas is still good
law, and it is the appropriate heuristic device to use in this case." 1 5
Other courts similarly have found that the holding in Desert Palace
was not intended to rewrite the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis. The Northern District of Texas in Owens v. Excel Manage-
ment Services, Inc., in determining the applicable standard of proof in
a Title VII claim, stated that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework is applicable despite Desert Palace.1 6 The court in Owens
felt that Desert Palace simply made clear that direct evidence of dis-
crimination is not necessary to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction
under Title VII.117 The court went on to further state that if the Su-
preme Court intended to depart from established employment law
precedent, it would have done so unmistakably." 8
Similar cases include the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case of
Pennington v. City of Huntsville,"9 and the United States Supreme
Court case of Raytheon Company v. Hernandez.2 ° In Pennington,
the court found that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) 12 1 is only applicable to
Title VII retaliation and discrimination cases.' 22 The Court in Ray-
theon applied the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework to a post-Desert Palace case, and did not even mention
Desert Palace in its opinion. 3
114. Id. at 1346.
115. Id.
116. Owens v. Excel Mgmt Services, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:02-CV-0835-, 2004 WL 358153 at *3
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2004).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff employee sued
defendant employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Employee appealed a grant
summary judgment for the employer entered in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Alabama.
120. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (employer appealed a judgment in favor
of the employee entered in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit based on an
Americans with Disabilities Act claim).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2005) ("Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in employment practices. Except as otherwise provided in this title [42
USCS §2000e et seq.], an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party DEMONSTRATES that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.") [emphasis
added].
122. Pennington, 261 F.3d at 1269.
123. See generally Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (purporting to show that
Desert Palace was not intended to rewrite the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis).
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The Middle District of Louisiana in Oby v. Baton Rouge Marriott,124
discussed above, is the only court that has extended Desert Palace's
modified McDonnell Douglas analysis to FMLA claims. It is uncertain
whether courts in future cases will apply the Court's holding in Desert
Palace to statutes other than Title VII.
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
The modified McDonnell Douglas analysis, which evolved out of
the Title VII case Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, should be applied
across-the-board to FMLA retaliation claims that used the traditional
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. The holding of Desert
Palace should apply to FMLA retaliation claims for three reasons.
First, the modified McDonnell Douglas analysis is consistent with the
FMLA's legislative intent. The Act was designed to prohibit employ-
ers from interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of (or
attempts to exercise) any rights provided by the Act, and discharging
or in any other way discriminating against any person (whether or not
an employee) for opposing or complaining about any unlawful prac-
tice under the Act.125 The Act's purpose is to entitle employees to
take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of
a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious
health condition, while at the same time accommodating the legiti-
mate interests of employers. 126
When an employee is claiming retaliation or discrimination by an
employer, in the absence of direct evidence, the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis is a heightened and more onerous standard
for the employee to meet. Arguably, it is a more onerous standard
than even the preponderance of evidence standard used in an interfer-
ence-with-FMLA-rights claim, which does not require a scheme shift-
ing the burdens back and forth and allows employees to prove their
claim by using either direct or indirect evidence or both.127 By re-
laxing the heightened standard of proof and eliminating the require-
ment for direct evidence, the legislative intent is furthered.
Second, the modified McDonnell Douglas analysis should be used
in FMLA retaliation claims because it is consistent with the Act's stat-
utory language and consistent with the interpretation of parallel stat-
utes. As discussed above in Oby, the text of the FMLA, like the text
124. Oby v. Baton Rouge Marriott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 772 (M.D. La. 2004).
125. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 (2000).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2)-(3) (2005).
127. Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2004), affg Potenza v. City of
New York Dep't of Transp., No. 00 Civ. 0707 (SHS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17112 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 23, 2001) (citing Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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of Title VII and ADEA, does not require a heightened showing
through direct evidence to prove retaliation or discrimination. 128 The
court in Oby concluded that the Desert Palace rationale applies to the
plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim as well as Title VII claims and that,
therefore, a heightened showing of direct evidence is not required. 2 9
Based on the lack of express language requiring a heightened showing
through direct evidence, the modified McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework is more consistent with the statutory language of
the FMLA than the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework.
The third reason the modified McDonnell Douglas analysis should
be used in FMLA retaliation claims is that it is the best policy solu-
tion, as deserving claimants would be more likely to prevail. Consider
the following hypothetical. Jan, a married woman in her late twenties,
is employed at XYZ Corp., a large corporation. Jan has been em-
ployed at XYZ since the completion of her bachelor's degree four
years prior. Upon receiving the news that she is expecting a baby in
six months, she notifies her employer of her intentions to take leave
upon the arrival of her newborn child. Her employer notifies her that
her leave is approved and approximately six months later, Jan has her
child. The day Jan's FMLA leave ends and she plans to return to
work, she is notified that she has been terminated from her position at
XYZ. Jan, having never used FMLA leave before and having re-
ceived excellent performance ratings during her time at XYZ, files
suit in federal court alleging retaliation/discrimination under the
FMLA.
Traditionally, with a lack of direct evidence, Jan would face the
heightened McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, and
would be required to show pretext to prevail under her retaliation
claim. Jan would be given the opportunity to present a prima facie
case of discrimination. She would present evidence that she had been
employed at XYZ for over four years with excellent performance rat-
ings. XYZ Corp. would then be given the opportunity to rebut Jan's
prima facie case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions. After XYZ Corp is given an opportunity to rebut Jan's
case, Jan is then afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the em-
ployer's reason for the adverse employment action was a mere pretext
for discrimination. 3 ° This would be a very onerous burden for Jan to
overcome, as it often falls on motives that cannot be found in the form
of direct evidence. Employees do not always have good luck acquir-
128. Oby, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 772. See also Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311
(5th Cir. 2004) (discussing language of the relevant provision of the ADEA which is similarly
silent as to the heightened direct evidence standard).
129. Oby, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 772.
130. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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ing a smoking gun in the form of memo or letter specifically stating
that XYZ Corp. really fired her for discriminatory or retaliatory rea-
sons. All too often, this comes in the form of circumstantial evidence.
In this hypothetical, the Jans of the world are faced with a very on-
erous standard of proof. All too often, this heightened standard of
proof prevents a seemingly valid claim of discrimination or retaliation,
as here, from prevailing.
Using the same hypothetical but applying the modified McDonnell
Douglas approach that followed the Court's decision in Desert Palace,
quite a different result could be reached. The Court in Desert Palace,
recognizing the importance of circumstantial evidence, relaxed the re-
quirement for direct evidence of discrimination.13 The modified Mc-
Donnell Douglas changes the third step of the burden-shifting
analysis, and once the defendant has stated a nondiscriminatory rea-
son for its actions, the plaintiff must show either: (1) the defendant's
reason is a pretext for discrimination; or (2) the defendant's reason,
though true, was also motivated by discriminatory considerations. If
the plaintiff can make that showing, the defendant employer must
prove that it would have made the same decision in the absence of its
discriminatory animus, 32 thereby, making it more likely for plaintiffs
to survive and prevail on legitimate claims.
The lower federal courts are mixed as to the application of the hold-
ing in Desert Palace. Extending the reasoning to the FMLA is directly
in line with legislative intent behind the act. The Desert Palace appli-
cation is also consistent with the FMLA's statutory language and con-
sistent with interpretation of parallel statutes. Finally, the extended
application of Desert Palace's holding is the best policy solution to ef-
fectuate the FMLA's purpose.
V. CONCLUSION
The law after Desert Palace lessens the onerous burden of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis and no longer requires a
heightened standard of proof in Title VII claims. It is not clear that
the reasoning from Desert Palace will extend to other statutes, includ-
ing the FMLA.
The lower federal courts are split as to whether the holding in De-
sert Palace and its modified McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting anal-
ysis extends beyond Title VII claims. Some courts have applied the
modified McDonnell Douglas to FMLA retaliation claims while other
131. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
132. Id. See also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (2003) (illustrating the shift in the burden to
the employer to justify its ultimate decision).
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courts have found that the holding in Desert Palace was not intended
to rewrite the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.
This article argues that courts should use the modified McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting analysis for all claims brought under the
FMLA for retaliation. First, the less onerous modified McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework is more consistent with the
FMLA's legislative intent. Second, the fact that the language of the
FMLA does not expressly have a heightened standard of proof is con-
sistent the FMLA's statutory language and with the interpretation of
parallel statutes such as Title VII and ADEA. Third, the implementa-
tion of the less onerous modified McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
is the best policy solution to effectuate the FMLA's purpose.
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